

Gender, Ethnicity and Grades: Empirical Evidence of Discrimination in Law-Firm Interviews

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It was 1949 when lawyer-wife Katharine Hepburn upstaged lawyer-husband Spencer Tracy before admiring fans. In the nearly forty years since, much has changed for female lawyers; any comparison between *Adam's Rib* and *L.A. Law* will show just how much. As women continue to enter the bar in large numbers, law firms themselves continue to change. Although female lawyers often do well for themselves, discrimination in many places persists.¹ This is also true for ethnic and racial minorities. While many minorities have joined the bar, discrimination continues.² In

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1. See *infra*, note 2.

2. Studies of gender and ethnic discrimination in the legal profession include, for example, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, *Women in Law* (1981); Karen Berger Morello, *The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to the Present* (1986); Barbara J. Burns, *Areas of Practice Chosen by Women Law Graduates*, Ill. B.J., May, 1986, at 434; Barbara A. Curran, *American lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition*, 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 19 (1986); Dorothy J. Glancy, *Women in Law: The Dependable Ones*, 21 Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 23 (June 1970); John P. Heinz, Edward Laumann, Charles Cappell, Terrence Halliday & Michael Schaalman, *Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar*, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 717; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, *Women in Law?: A Review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law*, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 189; Rita J. Simon & Kathryn Gardner, *Career Patterns Among University of Illinois Women Law Graduates*, 67 Women Law. J. 19 (1981); Rita J. Simon &

this study, we attempt to measure that discrimination³ against women and minorities, and to do so at the point of entry into the profession: the initial on-campus job interview with a law-firm.⁴

We also propose to study the impact of two other factors on interviews: G.P.A. and law-review membership. According to the professional lore, both matter critically. Consider the allure of the review. Several years ago, *Time* magazine called the *Harvard Law Review* members the "superachieving 8% in each class," and reported that "[l]aw firms fight fiercely to pay them starting salaries that top [the then-stratospheric figure of] \$40,000."⁵ True, each generation has had its nonconformists. Learned Hand joined the *Review* but then quit, supposedly because he "did not come to law school to edit a magazine";⁶ Thomas Eagleton quit as well, allegedly because he found the *Review* "a great bore."⁷ But few have had the nerve to make such choices. Instead, for decades the *Harvard Law Review* and its peer institutions have maintained an apparent stranglehold over law-student status. During that time, however, most of these reviews chose their members primarily on the basis of law-school grades.⁸ As a result, it was never clear that

Kathryn Gardner, *Still the Second Sex*, 10 *Student Law*. 18, 18 (Dec. 1981); Alexander Stille, *Outlook Better for Women, Asians: Little Room at the Top for Blacks, Hispanics*, *Nat'l L. J.*, Dec. 23, 1985, at 1; Marilyn Tucker & Judith A. Lhamon, *The Hiring Scorecard*, 12 *Student Law*. 23, 23 (Apr. 1984); James J. White, *Women in the Law*, 65 *Mich. L. Rev.* 1051 (1967); Bill Winter, *Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, But They're Happy*, 69 *A.B.A. J.* 1384 (1983); *Women Lawyers*, 70 *A.B.A. J.* 33 (1984).

3. For purposes of this study, we define discrimination as a situation where a law student at a job interview has (for whatever reason) a smaller chance of obtaining a call-back than other students with similar characteristics, including educational qualifications. We recognize that scholars have used a variety of other, often much broader and more sophisticated, definitions. We use this definition not because we believe it better, but only because we find its narrow scope more tractable for research purposes. For a discussion of various concepts of discrimination, see generally Christine A. Littleton, *Equality and Feminist Legal Theory*, 48 *U. Pitt. L. Rev.* 1043 (1987).

4. We make no judgment about the value or usefulness of various types of employment. We limit ourselves to law-firm jobs only because those are the positions that the students we investigated hoped to obtain.

Although we know which students eventually received job offers after participating in a second interview at the firm's home office, we have not counted the number of students who accepted the call-back but interviewed unsuccessfully. We counted only the students who *succeeded* at the home office interview. In other words, we did not count the students who *failed* to obtain a job offer. As a result, we generally confine ourselves to a discussion of the call-back offers rather than the job offers.

5. *La Creme de la Creme—Brulee*, *Time*, Feb. 15, 1982, at 54.

6. Gerald Gunther, *Memoirs*, in *Harvard Law Review Centennial Album* 123, 124 (1987) [hereinafter cited as *Centennial*] (the possibly apocryphal Hand quotation is part of the general lore of the legal profession).

7. Thomas F. Eagleton, *Memoirs*, *id.* at 30.

8. See Erwin N. Griswold, *The Harvard Law Review—Glimpses of Its History*

review membership was not a redundant credential—it was never clear how much its members owed their lucrative job offers to their high grades and how much to the review itself.

We begin this essay by disentangling the effects of G.P.A. and law review. Not surprisingly, we found that (1) high grades increased a student's ability to obtain a second interview at the firm's home office (a "call-back"), and (2) law-review membership further enhanced a student's chance of a call-back. We also found, however, (a) that the benefit of law-review membership fell as student G.P.A. rose, and (b) that large firms cared more about G.P.A. than review membership, while for small firms the opposite was true. Second, we discuss the evidence on discrimination by ethnicity. According to our data, minority students in the first three G.P.A. quartiles found it harder to obtain a call-back than equally qualified non-minority students. Unfortunately, we have evidence from too few interviews to attribute any statistical significance to this conclusion. Third, we turn to discrimination by gender. Our evidence shows that: (1) both male and female interviewers preferred second-year female students to equally qualified male students; (2) among low-G.P.A. students, male interviewers more strongly preferred second-year female students than female interviewers did; (3) low-G.P.A. second-year female students had a better chance of obtaining a call-back if they interviewed with a man than with a woman; and (4) the male preference for female students was stronger among second-year students than among third-year students.

Because of the politically sensitive nature of this study, we emphasize its limitations at the outset. First, we investigated the interviews at only one law school and during only one fall interviewing season. We believe our results are representative, but we have no proof of such. Second, we investigated only the initial on-campus law-firm interview. We decline to predict how students will fare later in their careers. Because second-year students conducted many more interviews than third-year students, moreover, we have focused primarily on second-year students. Third, by the very nature of our data, we ignored many potentially relevant factors: for example, the status, rank, and age of the interviewers, the areas of law in which the interviewers specialized, the courses that the students took, or the poise, looks, age, and maturity of the students. Fourth, our evidence does not prove *why* any event takes place. Although we propose explanations, many readers will ad-

as *Seen by an Aficionado*, in Centennial, *supra* note 6, at 1, 6-16 (discussing *Harvard Law Review* selection policies).

vance their own. Last, we deliberately do not suggest how students, law firms, or law schools should deal with the evidence we present. Rather than debating the virtues of any policies we advance, we would prefer our readers to discuss the evidence itself.

I. The Study⁹

The interviews we studied took place at the UCLA School of Law. Although founded only four decades ago, the school has successfully leapfrogged up the law school hierarchy. With its advance have risen the fortunes of its graduates. By the mid-1980s, the school placed almost all its graduates in well-paying, law-related positions. According to the school's spring 1987 survey, most of its third-year respondents had found jobs by the time they graduated. They reported a modal salary of \$52,000, and some students claimed starting salaries reaching \$70,000.

The interviewing process at UCLA works roughly as follows. At the beginning of the fall semester, the students rank the law firms with which they most want to interview. The placement office computer then assigns them interviews according to those rankings in a manner that gives all students relatively equal numbers of interviews. In effect, the students use the rankings to compete among themselves for on-campus interviews. The firms can limit the number of students they will see, but cannot deny specific students interviews because of their resumes. After the on-campus interviews, the law firms invite selected students to the firm's office for a more extensive interview (the call-back). Students who succeed at this call-back interview receive a job offer: a summer associate position for second-year students (a summer internship), or a regular associate position for third-year students. Second-year students generally find themselves evaluated again at the the end of their internship—this time for a regular associate position. Those who receive such an offer and who found their summer internship satisfactory often do not interview elsewhere during their third year.

We obtained our data from several sources. We collected information about student interviewing success from the law school's interview schedules and the reports that the school required inter-

9. For a more technical discussion of the statistical measures used in this study, see I.P.L. Png, David Eaves & J. Mark Ramseyer, *Gender and Discrimination: The Case of Law School Job Interviews*, (unpublished manuscript, 1989, on file with *Law & Inequality*). For background to the empirical methodology, see generally David A. Hensher & Lester W. Johnson, *Applied Discrete Choice Modelling* (1981); Peter J. Bickel & Kjell A. Doksum, *Mathematical Statistics* (1977); Henri Theil, *Principles of Econometrics* (1971).

viewing firms to submit to its placement office. On these reports, the firms listed the students to whom they offered call-backs and the students to whom they eventually offered jobs. We obtained information about (1) the number of lawyers and (2) the ratios of female to male lawyers at the interviewing office of a firm and of the minority to total lawyers (the firm gender ratio and ethnicity ratio) from the National Association for Law Placement's law-firm questionnaire, the placement office files, and the Martindale-Hubbell law directory. Because branch offices of large firms generally hire their own lawyers, we treated each office as a separate firm. We identified interviewer gender and ethnicity from the law-firm interview schedules, the placement office files, and—when necessary—the firms themselves. We gathered information about student gender, ethnicity,¹⁰ and G.P.A. from the school registrar.¹¹ Finally, we obtained information on law-review membership from the law-review office. After compiling this data, we checked it for completeness and accuracy against other available information. We then eliminated incomplete or inaccurate records. This procedure left us with a sample of 1,317 interviews held in the fall, 1986.¹² They involved a total of 81 law firms and 229 second-year (146 men, 83 women) and 133 third-year (77 men, 56 women) law students.

Table 1 outlines the composition of the student body, and shows the extent to which students participated in the on-campus interviews. We note, in addition, that the law review has 85-95 student members. It chooses most of these students by a writing competition during the spring of the student's first year and some on the basis of a publishable essay submitted later. At neither time does it consider a candidate's G.P.A. During the fall, 1986, the law review included 27 female members.

II. Grades and Law Review Membership

A. Introduction

Before examining the evidence on gender and ethnic discrimination, consider which characteristics will most likely matter at law-firm interviews. In particular, consider Table 2—a discrete-

10. This information is based on self-identification by the student.

11. In order to ensure the confidentiality of the G.P.A. data, a professor not involved in this study coded the information before forwarding it to us.

12. Interviewers held a total of 5484 interviews at the school during the fall semester. The sample consisted of an estimated 24% of the total population of interviews. Sample shrinkage can be attributed mainly to the failure of firms to submit their reports to the school as required—probably out of a reluctance to complete the somewhat time-consuming paperwork.

TABLE 1
Participation in Interviews^a

CPA quartile	A. Second Year									
	A. Total male students interviewing	B. Total female students interviewing	C. Male students interviewing	D. Female students interviewing	E. Number interviews (males)	F. Number interviews (females)	G. Male participation	H. Female participation	I. Male frequency (E/C)	J. Female frequency (F/D)
First	47	27	44	17	155	56	93.6	63.0	3.5	3.3
Second	48	27	39	26	114	102	81.3	96.3	2.9	3.9
Third	43	32	38	22	215	120	88.4	68.8	5.7	5.5
Fourth	49	25	25	18	107	53	51.0	72.0	4.3	2.9
Total	187	111	146	83	591	331	78.1	74.8	4.0	4.0
B. Third Year										
First	48	21	21	3	57	9	43.8	14.3	2.7	3.0
Second	36	34	22	18	75	51	61.1	52.9	3.4	2.8
Third	38	32	17	24	55	76	44.5	75.0	3.2	3.2
Fourth	36	33	17	11	43	29	47.2	33.3	2.5	2.6
Total	158	120	77	56	230	165	48.7	46.7	3.0	2.9

^a Columns C-F show the number of interviews and interviewees in our sample. Because not all interviews were included in the sample (the reporting and filtering processes excluded many interviews), the actual number of interviews was probably much higher and the actual number of interviewees somewhat higher. As a result, the actual interviewing frequencies probably exceeded the frequencies shown on columns I and J.

choice logit model that included all the variables we thought might affect the outcome of an interview.¹³ We expected that a high G.P.A. and law-review membership would increase a student's ability to obtain a call-back, that large firms would be more selective than small, and that firms that were located further from Los Angeles would be more reluctant to call back students than comparable Los Angeles firms. We suspected that ethnicity and gender might also influence the outcome of interviews, but were uncertain of the direction in which they would do so.

The "asymptotic T-ratios" column in Table 2 measures the direction and statistical significance of each variable. According to these T-ratios, second-year students are most likely to obtain a call-back if (1) they have high G.P.A.s, (2) they are female, (3) they interview with non-L.A. firms, (4) they interview with small firms, (5) they are members of the law review, and (6) they interview with a non-minority interviewer.

For the sake of readers unfamiliar with statistical analysis, we include a short explanation. If the T-ratio for a variable is negative, then an increase in the value of that variable correlates with a smaller probability of a call-back; if the T-ratio is less than -1.96, then that correlation is statistically significant. For example, the variable for "office location" is 1 if a firm's office is in Los Angeles County, and 0 if elsewhere. The value of the variable is thus high for L.A. firms and low for non-L.A. firms. The variable's T-ratio of -2.6664 indicates that an interview with an L.A. firm (the *high* value of the variable) is *less* likely to result in a call-back than an interview with a non-L.A. firm (the *low* value of the variable).

Likewise, "interviewer ethnicity" is 1 if a student interviewed with a minority member, and 0 if he or she did not. The T-ratio of -2.2293 indicates that an interview with a minority interviewer is less likely to result in a call-back than an interview with a non-minority. Finally, the T-ratio for "office size" is -2.5366: The larger the office (the higher the variable), the less likely the call-

13. The explanatory variables are G.P.A., Student Gender, Office Location, Office Size, Law-Review Membership, Interviewer Ethnicity, Interviewer Gender, Office Gender-Ratio, Student Ethnicity, and Office Ethnicity-Ratio. Data from mixed gender interviewer teams were excluded. All explanatory variables were tested for significance of explanatory power.

The specific model employed was the discrete-choice logit model, in which it is postulated that:

$$\text{Prob \{call back\}} = 1 / (1 + e^{\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{B}})$$

where

$$\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{B} = a_0 + a_1\text{GPA} + a_2\text{STUDGDR} + a_3\text{OFFLOC} + a_4\text{OFFSIZE} + a_5\text{REVIEW} + a_6\text{INTETH} + a_7\text{INTGDR} + a_8\text{OFFGRAT} + a_9\text{STUETH} + a_{10}\text{OFFERAT}.$$

See Hensher & Johnson, *supra* note 9.

TABLE 2
Logit Model

A. Second Year

Variables	Estimates	Asymptotic Standard Errors	Asymptotic T-ratios
G.P.A.	.21730*	.025576	8.4960
Student gender (0=male)	.54613*	.19243	2.8380
Office location (0=not L.A. county)	-.58659*	.21999	-2.6664
Office size	-.0059969*	.0023642	-2.5366
Review (0=non-member)	.65405*	.26241	2.4924
Interviewer ethnicity (0=non-minority)	-1.8241*	.81824	-2.2293
Interviewer gender (0=male)	.24188	.21959	1.1015
Office gender ratio	-1.1409	1.1310	-1.0087
Student ethnicity (0=non-minority)	-.24672	.35216	-.70060
Office ethnicity ratio	-.73770	1.4914	-.49464
Constant	-17.987*	2.0087	-8.9543

Likelihood ratio test: 124.841 with 10 degrees of freedom.

Log-likelihood function = -369.9790.

*Significant at the 95% level.

B. Third Year

Variables	Estimates	Asymptotic Standard Errors	Asymptotic T-ratios
G.P.A.	.16687*	.050250	3.3207
Student gender (0=male)	.32621	.30542	1.0681
Office location (0=not L.A. county)	.42269	.32300	-1.3083
Office size	-.0017620	.0034005	-.51818
Review (0=non-member)	.93900*	.33640	2.7913
Interviewer gender (0=male)	-1.1326*	.39064	-2.8994
Office gender ratio	-.87559	1.6836	-.52006
Student ethnicity (0=non-minority)	-.43152	.51676	-.83504
Office ethnicity ratio	-9.0333*	3.7745	-2.3933
Constant	-14.188*	4.0640	-3.4910

Likelihood ratio test: 42.1842 with 9 degrees of freedom.

Log-likelihood function = -155.7746.

Interviewer ethnicity omitted because of instability (standard error = 267,350).

*Significant at the 95% level.

back. Because in each case the T-ratio is less than -1.96, each of these results is statistically significant.

Conversely, if the T-ratio for a variable is positive, an increase in the value of that variable correlates with a *greater* probability of a call-back; if the T-ratio is larger than 1.96, the cor-

relation is statistically significant. Note that the T-ratios for G.P.A., student gender (1 if female, 0 if male), and law review (1 if member, 0 if not) are all greater than 1.96. Table 2 thus shows that students are significantly more likely to obtain a call-back if they have a high G.P.A., are female, and are law-review members.

The reader should bear in mind two qualifications. First, most of the third-year data is statistically less significant than the second-year data. For each of the variables discussed above, however, the direction of the effect is nonetheless the same. Second, Table 2 suggests no significant conclusions at the second-year level about interviewer gender, office gender and ethnicity ratios, or student ethnicity.

We devote this attention to Table 2 because it tests the impact of the variables exactly. In measuring the effect of each variable, Table 2 holds constant the effect of all others. As a result, it measures precisely each variable's "stand-alone" effect. Nevertheless, because Table 2 is also somewhat difficult to understand, we discuss in Sections II and III the effect these variables have in a less precise but (we hope) intuitively clearer fashion. In Section IV, we turn to the effect that some of these variables (*e.g.*, interviewer gender) have when they interact with others (*e.g.*, student gender).

B. Grade-Point Average

Table 3 more dramatically illustrates exactly how G.P.A. affects a student's success rate.¹⁴ Second-year students in the first quartile obtained call-backs at almost every other interview, a success rate of .430, while those in the fourth quartile obtained one call-back in every fifteen interviews, a success rate of .069. From the fourth quartile to the first, an increase in the interviewing success rate accompanied each step increase in G.P.A. If—as seems reasonable—high-G.P.A. students interview with more selective firms than low-G.P.A. students, Table 3 may *understate* the importance of one's G.P.A.

C. Law-Review Membership

Law-review work can demand significant amounts of time. Students have complained about this work for decades, of course,

14. By success rate, we refer only to the probability of obtaining a call back at a given law-firm interview.

According to the test used for Table 2, the impact of G.P.A. on interviewing success is statistically significant at the 95% level for both second- and third-year students.

TABLE 3
G.P.A. and Probability of Success

GPA quartile	Second ^a year	Third year	Second & third combined
First	.430 ^b	.318	.419
Second	.238	.231	.272
Third	.122	.190	.155
Fourth	.069	.030	.056
All students	.205	.186	.223

^a Whenever comparisons are made between second- and third-year students in this study, the comparison is between two different sets of students and is not a longitudinal study of the same students over time.

^b Ratio of number of calls-back to number of interviews.

and argued that it significantly hampered their class work. When asked to reminisce, one former editor of the *Harvard Law Review* spoke for many alumni and alumnae when he answered simply: "I am afraid that I have repressed it all."¹⁵ Yet no one has ever actually shown that this work hurts academic performance. If student rumors about the effect of review work on G.P.A. were true, however, then the marginal contribution of law-review membership (the interviewing benefit of membership after adjusting for G.P.A.) would become critical. Table 4 therefore explores this contribution.

Consistent with student rumors, law-review members do interview more successfully than other students. Second-year review members obtained a call-back in 42.5 percent of their interviews, while non-members obtained call-backs in only 23.7 percent of theirs.¹⁶ Furthermore, review membership benefits students independently of their G.P.A.—though the benefit to high-G.P.A. students is rather modest. According to Table 4, a second-year student in the third quartile could more than double his or her interviewing success rate (from 12.6 percent to 28.0 percent) by joining the review. A first quartile student, however, could increase his or her success rate by only one fourth (from 46.9 percent to 59.4 percent).¹⁷ In short, the benefit of review membership declined as a student's G.P.A. increased. In schools where the re-

15. Anonymous, *Memoirs*, in *Centennial*, *supra* note 6, at 21, 21.

16. According to the test used for Table 2, the impact of review membership on interviewing success is statistically significant at the 95% level for both second- and third-year students.

17. The difference in the beneficial effect of review membership for second-year students in the first and third quartiles is statistically significant at more than the 90% level.

TABLE 4
Law Review Membership and Probability of Success
(Second Year)

GPA quartile	A. Review	B. Non-review	A/B
First	.594	.469	1.27
Second	.373	.245	1.52
Third	.280	.126	2.22
Fourth	N.A. ^a	.117	N.A.
All students	.425	.237	1.79

^a No review members had G.P.A.s in this quartile.

view chooses its members solely by G.P.A., review membership would convey little additional information. As a result, one would expect the review there to have even less effect on its members' interviewing success.

If review membership did decrease G.P.A., then Table 4 would also show the possible opportunity costs of that membership. Take, for example, students in the second quartile. If they joined the review and maintained their grades, they would increase their success rate from 24.5 percent to 37.3 percent. If the time spent on review work would otherwise have raised their G.P.A. one quartile, then in terms of interviewing success the bargain was not worth it—for an increase in G.P.A. would have raised their success rate to 46.9 percent. On the other hand, for third-quartile students the reverse would have been true—review membership would have increased their success rate from 12.6 percent to 28.0 percent, while a one-quartile G.P.A. rise would have increased it only to 24.5 percent.¹⁸

In fact, however, student concern over the effect of law-review work on G.P.A. may be entirely misplaced: Our data do not show that review work lowers G.P.A. On the contrary, over the course of 1986-87, the mean G.P.A. of second-year law-review members actually *increased* slightly, while that of non-review second-year students *decreased*. Because the difference in the G.P.A.

18. Employers might make an analogous, off-setting calculation by assuming that a law-review member's G.P.A. (after that student has been on the review for more than a semester) *understates* his or her real abilities. Were employers to make such an off-setting adjustment, a sophisticated student would not ask the questions posed in the text. Instead, the student would ask whether his or her G.P.A. was likely to fall *more than the average amount* as a result of his or her joining the review. We do not know how often employers make such an adjustment. As noted below, however, our evidence indicates that student G.P.A.s typically do *not* decrease after they join the review.

change for the two groups is not statistically significant, one cannot claim that review membership raises G.P.A. Neither, however, can one claim that it lowers it.

D. Firm-Size and the Importance of G.P.A. and Review

Observers persistently claim that large firms care more about G.P.A. and review membership than small firms. They advance a variety of reasons: For example, large-firm associates write more memoranda and thus find more helpful the skills the review teaches; the clients of large firms attach more importance to traditional indices of ability than small-firm clients; and small-firm associates are more likely to need skills other than the ability to write and take tests. Consider, therefore, Table 5.

TABLE 5
Office Size, G.P.A., and Law Review Membership
(Second Year)

G.P.A. quartile	Probability of Success				Probability of Success		
	A. Large firms (>29 ^a)	B. Small firms (<29)	A/B		A. Large firms	B. Small firms	A/B
First	.563	.467	1.21	Review member	.338	.600	.56
Second	.285	.349	.82		Non-review members	.262	.242
Third	.104	.252	.41	All students		.271	.271
Fourth	.052	.085	.61				
All students	.271	.271	1.00				

^a Median size of law offices that interviewed second-year students.

This table suggests that the hypothesis above is true about G.P.A. but not about law review. Large firms do care about grades. Students in the first quartile have a better chance of obtaining a call-back at a large firm than a small firm (56.3 percent at a large firm compared with 46.7 percent at a small firm). Students in the last three quartiles encounter the opposite phenomenon: They have a better chance of a call-back at a small firm than a large (8.5 percent at a small firm compared with 5.2 percent at a large firm for fourth-quartile students).¹⁹ By contrast, large firms

19. The reader, however, should consider that (1) when high-G.P.A. students

seem less concerned about law-review membership. Review members have a better chance of a call-back at a small firm (60.0 percent) than a large firm (33.8 percent), while students not on the review do slightly better at large firms (26.2 percent) than small firms (24.2 percent). To put the same point differently, review membership gives a 2.48 times advantage at small firms ($.600/.242 = 2.48$), but only a 1.29 times advantage at large firms ($.338/.262 = 1.29$).²⁰

In other words, the data suggest (though do not prove)²¹ a hypothesis contrary to the folk wisdom: Small firms value *visible* credentials like review membership (since former review members can prominently display their bound volumes and plaques in their offices), while large firms value indices of ability like grades that after graduation few people will notice (unless the students earn honors or coif membership). Large firms may not need the extra credentials students bring, in short, yet may nonetheless consider grades a good predictor of graduate performance.

III. The Effect of Minority Status

Law-firm interviewers do seem to discriminate against minority students in the first three G.P.A. quartiles. According to Table 6, these students had a smaller chance of obtaining a call-back than their non-minority peers: even top-G.P.A. minority students had lower success rates than non-minority students, and third-quartile minority students had *less than half* the success rate of non-minority students. Only those in the fourth quartile had at least the success rate of their non-minority peers.

Unfortunately, our sample included too few minority student interviews to attach any statistical significance to these results. Our sample contained only 207 minority student interviews, and those interviews resulted in only 21 call-backs. We would have preferred to ask several other questions: for example, do minority

interview with small firms, they may interview at highly selective "boutique" firms, and (2) at the third-year level, students have higher success rates at the smaller firms in all quartiles.

20. At the third-year level, both review and non-review members have higher success rates at smaller firms. Nevertheless, review membership still provides a greater advantage at the smaller firms (1.52) than at the large (1.14).

21. One could advance a variety of other hypotheses equally consistent with this data. For example, small firms may know that large firms value G.P.A. more than law-review membership and assume that high-G.P.A. students will eventually accept job offers from the higher-paying large firms. Rather than use resources to interview students who would not accept their offers in any event, they call back students with lower G.P.A.s. Among those lower-G.P.A. students, they concentrate their efforts on law-review members.

TABLE 6
Ethnic Status and Probability of Success
(Both Years^a)

GPA quartile	A. Non-Minority	B. Minority	C. A/B
First	.433	.400	1.08
Second	.255	.250	1.02
Third	.158	0.65	2.43
Fourth	.049	0.68	0.72
All students	.246	.101	2.43

^a Second and third years aggregated because of small numbers

students interview more successfully at large firms or small; do minority students interview with the same sized firms as their non-minority peers; does the treatment of minority students change from the second year to the third; within the minority student population are members of some ethnic groups more successful at obtaining call-backs than others; and do interviewers treat minority women differently than minority men? Once again, however, the small number of minority students in our sample prevented us from reaching meaningful conclusions on these issues.

IV. The Effect of Gender

A. *The Preference for Women*

Of the factors tested in Table 2, the one after G.P.A. that most clearly affects second-year interviewing success is the student's gender. The asymptotic T-ratio of 2.8380 for student gender indicates a statistically significant preference for women. Contrary to much mythology about the initial interview, law firms apparently prefer equally qualified women to men.²² The statistics are

22. This predilection occurs despite under-representation of women on the review. This raises questions about (1) the finding in Glancy, *supra* note 2, at 24, that women law students received fewer job offers per given number of interviews than men, and (2) general psychological studies showing that interviews result in discrimination against women. See, e.g., Robert L. Dipboye, Richard Arvey, & David Terpstra, *Equal Employment and the Interview*, 55 Personnel J. 520 (1976); Robert L. Dipboye & Jack Wiley, *Reactions of College Recruiters to Interviewee Sex and Self-Presentation Style*, 10 J. Vocational Behav. 1 (1977). Furthermore, our findings suggest that where interviews are involved, studies based solely on evaluations of male and female resumes or publications may have only limited relevance. See, e.g., Richard D. Arvey, *Unfair Discrimination in the Employment Interview*, 86 Psychological Bull. 736, 746-56 (1979); Virginia E. O'Leary & Ranald D. Hasen, *Trying Hurts Women, Helps Men: The Meaning of Effort*, in *Women in the Work Force* 100 (H. John Bernardin ed. 1982).

straightforward: among second-year students, men received call-backs at 20.3 percent of their interviews, while women received them at 26.9 percent. Furthermore, this law-firm preference for women seems (however tentative our data may be)²³ to continue at the home-office interview itself: the firms offered jobs to 53.9 percent of the women given call-backs, but to only 48.0 percent of the men.²⁴

This law-firm preference for women does not reflect observable differences in academic qualifications. The men and women in our sample had comparable educational records (a median male G.P.A. of 78.8 and a female median of 79.1).²⁵ And in any event, interviewers preferred women at almost every G.P.A. quartile:

TABLE 7
Student Gender and Probability of Success

A. Second Year			
GPA quartile	A. Male	B. Female	C. A/B
First	.416	.571	.73
Second	.236	.262	.90
Third	.079	.205	.39
Fourth	.054	.138	.39
B. Third Year			
GPA quartile	A. Male	B. Female	C. A/B
First	.333	.333	1.00
Second	.240	.353	.68
Third	.204	.184	1.11
Fourth	.023	.034	.68

Readers will have their own reasons for this phenomenon, but we offer three possibilities: maturity, a male preference for female students, and choice of firm. First, women may exhibit greater maturity, poise, or other attributes not captured by our data. In fact, given the overwhelmingly male character of the bar, interviewers may believe female students are less likely to have

23. We have not counted the number of students offered call-backs who actually visited the firm's home office. Thus, these percentages could reflect a higher rate of accepting call-backs among women.

24. This figure represents jobs offered to second-year students. Among all students, the figures were 52.3% and 45.2%.

25. This median applies to second-year students. Among the third-year students in our sample, the median G.P.A. for men was 78.9, and the median G.P.A. for women was 78.8.

"fallen into" law school and more likely to be enthusiastic about practicing law. Second, for whatever reason,²⁶ male interviewers may prefer to hire women. Since male lawyers hold the majority of the interviews at the school, any such preference would give an interviewing advantage to female students. Third, perhaps because they fear discrimination, women may systematically interview at firms that either are less selective or are known to be particularly partial to women. Our data do not enable us to test the first hypothesis, but do offer some evidence on the second and third hypotheses.

B. *The Male Preference for Women*

1. Evidence of the Preference

In order to test the possibility of a male preference for women, we compared the call-backs offered by male and female interviewers. The results confirm the existence of such a preference: both male and female interviewers preferred second-year female students to male, but male interviewers preferred women by a wider margin than did female interviewers.²⁷ Male interviewers offered call-backs to only 18.3 percent of the men, but to 25.2 percent of the women. Female interviewers offered call-backs to about the same percentage of the women (25.3 percent) but to only 21.3 percent of the men. Both male and female interviewers favored women to men, in other words, but male interviewers favored them more strongly.

2. The Male Preference and Low G.P.A. Students

This male preference for female students becomes more pronounced the lower a student's G.P.A. is. Thus, turn to the success rates for second-year students with below-median G.P.A.s: Table 9 shows that the male preference for women becomes clearer as G.P.A. falls.²⁸ Among below-median students, male interviewers

26. Various possibilities are explored below at text accompanying notes 31-33, *infra*.

27. The logit model used in Table 2 does not test for interaction effects among the variables. Hence, in the following analysis we present tests of statistical significance as well.

These tests are based on an assumption that the number of interviews is large enough that sample probabilities have approximately normal distribution.

Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, *supra* note 9, at Table 1, presents the results of a logit model in which the gender variables were allowed to interact with each other. The results indicate that the interaction between male interviewers and female students has an effect on the outcome of interviews that is statistically significant at the 95% level.

28. According to the "comparison of means" test used in Table 9, the difference

TABLE 8
Probability of Success and Gender
(Second Year)

			Student		Dif. ^a	Norm. ^f
			M	F		
Interviewer	M	No. interviews ^a	383	218	-.069	-1.96
		Called Back ^b	70	55		
	p call back ^c	.183	.252			
		Var (p) ^d	.00039	.00085	.00124	
	F	No. interviews	150	83	-.040	-0.68
		Called back	32	21		
		p call-back	.213	.253		
		Var (p)	.00112	.00228	.00340	
	B ^e	No. interviews	58	30	-.123	-1.13
		Called back	18	13		
		p call-back	.310	.433		
		Var (p)	.00369	.00818	.00119	

^a Number of interviews (n) in sample.

^b Number of calls-back (x) offered.

^c Probability of call back ($p = x/n$).

^d Variance of probability ($S_i^2 = [p_i][1 - p_i]/n_i$).

^e Difference between call-back probabilities for male and female students ($p_m - p_f$).

^f Normalization of difference ($[p_m - p_f]/\sqrt{S_m^2 + S_f^2}$).

^g Interviewing teams including both genders.

preferred women by a difference of .120. Female interviewers preferred women by only .031. Male interviewers, it seems, preferred women over men nearly four times as strongly as did female interviewers. Furthermore, this male preference gives a tactical advantage to those women who interview with a male lawyer. A female student had an 18.5 percent chance of a call-back with a male interviewer, but only an 11.1 percent chance with a female interviewer.

3. The Male Preference and Firm Size

Table 10 shows that male interviewers from small firms favor

between the preference by male and female interviewers for female students is, among below-median-G.P.A. students, statistically significant at nearly the 90% level. Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, *supra* note 9, at Table 1, however, presents a logit model in which the gender variables were allowed to interact with each other, with the statistically significant effect described in note 27, *supra*. When student G.P.A. is also allowed to interact with the gender variables, the logit model indicates (again, at the 95% confidence level) that as student G.P.A. falls, the effect of cross-gender interaction increases. See Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, *supra* note 9, at Table 2.

TABLE 9
Probability of Success and Gender
(Below Median GPA Second Years Students)

		Student		Dif.	Norm.
		M	F		
Male Interviewer	Number	185	108		
	Called back	12	20		
	p call-back	.065	.185	-0.120	-2.90
	Var (p)	.00033	.00840	.00173	
Female	Number	75	45		
	Called back	6	5		
	p call-back	.080	.111	-.031	-0.55
	Var (p)	.00098	.00219	.00317	

second-year women more strongly than their peers at the large firms favor them.²⁹ According to the table, male interviewers from large firms favored women by a difference of .022, while those from small firms favored them by .178. Men from small firms, in short, favored women at over eight times the rate by which men from large firms favored them.³⁰

4. Reasons for the Preference

Our data do not, of course, prove *why* male interviewers prefer women students. Readers may have their own theories; we note the following possibilities. First, many interviews between men and women may produce an intangible heterosexual attraction.³¹ This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that the prefer-

29. Curiously, much of the conventional literature has documented a tendency for many women to work at very large firms. See, e.g., Barbara A. Curran, Katherine J. Rosich, Clara N. Carson & Mark C. Puccetti, Supplement to the Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in 1985, at 4 (1986); Curran, *supra* note 2, at 42-49; Stille, *supra* note 2, at 6; Tucker & Lhamon, *supra* note 2, at 24; White, *supra* note 2, at 1058-60.

30. This difference in the male preference for women between large-firm interviewers and small-firm interviewers is statistically significant at above the 95% level.

Although some collinearity between firm size and firm gender ratio did exist, it was not significant. Thus, the greater male preference for female students in the smaller firms cannot be attributed to any relation between firm gender ratio and the male preference for women (see Table 11).

31. If women are indeed being hired in part because of sexual attraction, the consequences of that fact for their later careers is unclear. It could result in their not being taken seriously as lawyers or being subject to sexual harassment. It could also, however, simply reflect how much people enjoy talking and working with people of the other gender.

TABLE 10
Probability of Success with Male Interviewer by Office Size
(Second Year)

		Student		Dif.	Norm.
		M	F		
Large firms	No. interviews	268	151		
	Called back	51	32		
	p call-back	.190	.212	-.022	-.53
	Var (p)	.00057	.00111	.00168	
Small firms	No. interviews	115	67		
	Called back	19	23		
	p call-back	.165	.343	-.178	-2.64
	Var (p)	.00120	.00336	.00456	

ence is most noticeable (1) at interviews involving low-G.P.A. students (Table 9), and (2) among the interviewers from the smaller firms (Table 10). After all, one would most expect to notice the effect of any sexual attraction at those interviews where the student was least likely otherwise to obtain a call-back (among the low-G.P.A. students), or where the interviewer had the greatest hiring discretion and greatest opportunity later to meet the student (at the smaller firms). Second, men may feel guilty about the way their firms (or the legal profession generally) have treated women. Consequently, they may favor female students to atone for that treatment. Third, men may believe female students will bring different values to the firm, and hope that by hiring more women they can create a less stressful environment.³² Fourth, men may fear sex-discrimination lawsuits more than do women. To protect their firm against such litigation, they may try to increase the percentage of women at the firm. Fifth, men may have more confidence in their ability to evaluate male students than female students. As a result, they may believe they can spot unsatisfactory men without calling them back to the firm, but have less such assurance about women. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to distinguish among these hypotheses.

Some of our colleagues suggested that our data may show less an attraction between male lawyers and women than a reluctance by female lawyers to offer call-backs to other women. First, female lawyers may fear that other lawyers will label them "femi-

32. For a careful discussion of the possibility that women bring different values to the profession, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, *Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process*, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985).

nist" unless they reject women more often than male interviewers. Second, many female lawyers may believe their firms have treated them unfairly. In order to spare younger women the mistreatment they experienced, they may hesitate to call back female students. Third, to the extent a firm segregates women and keeps them outside its mainstream, women may compete *among* themselves for the few available "female" jobs at the firm. Female lawyers may thus see female students less as future colleagues than as competitors.³³

To explore this second set of hypotheses, we considered the effect of firm gender ratio (the ratio of women to men at the firm) on call-back rates. According to Table 11, men at the lower gender-ratio firms (firms with lower percentages of women) favored second-year women by a difference of .094, while men at the higher gender-ratio firms favored women by only .038. By contrast, women at the lower gender-ratio firms treated men and women alike, while women at the higher gender-ratio firms favored women by .103.³⁴ The male preference for women thus *fell* with an increase in the gender-ratio, while the female preference for women *rose*.

This evidence casts doubt on the notion that competition among women might explain the results in Tables 8 and 9. First, in neither high- nor low-gender-ratio firms did women discriminate *against* women. Were intra-gender competition a factor, one would expect female interviewers to treat female students more harshly than male students. In neither group did that phenomenon occur. Second, the greater the percentage of women at a firm, the more the women at that firm seemed to favor female students. A straightforward theory of competition would suggest the contrary.

33. Alternatively, some female lawyers may believe that their law firm—however much it promises them benefits like maternity leave—will only carry out those promises if the demand for the benefits remains low. In order to insure that such benefits remain available, therefore, these women may try to restrict the number of other lawyers (i.e., other women) who will demand them. Still other female lawyers may plan to use such benefits themselves but believe that their male peers respect women who do not demand such benefits more highly than those who do. In order to prevent unfavorable comparisons with women who will not use the benefits, these women may deny call-backs to women they think will not demand them.

34. This analysis should be considered more skeptically than the analysis elsewhere in this paper. The difference between (a) the different male treatment of students by gender at high- and low-gender-ratio firms and (b) the different female treatment of students by gender at high- and low-gender-ratio firms is statistically significant at only the 85% level. Furthermore, the third-year interviews present a very different story. See note 42, *infra*.

TABLE 11
Interviews by Office Gender Ratio
(Second Year)

				Student			
				M	F	Dif.	Norm.
Low gender ratio firms (< .22 ^a)	Interviewer	M	No. interviews	227	111		
			Called back	38	29		
		p call-back	.167	.261	-.094	-1.94	
		Var (p)	.00061	.00174	.00235		
High gender ratio firms (> .22)	Interviewer	F	No. interviews	95	50		
			Called back	21	11		
		p call-back	.221	.220	.001	0.01	
		Var (p)	.00181	.00343	.00524		
		M	No. interviews	156	107		
			Called back	32	26		
		p call-back	.205	.243	-.038	-0.72	
		Var (p)	.00105	.00172	.00276		
		F	No. interviews	55	33		
			Called back	11	10		
		p call-back	.200	.303	-.103	-1.07	
		Var (p)	.00291	.00640	.00931		

^a Median gender ratio of firms in sample.

At the same time, the evidence supports (however ambiguously) the notion that some women may reject female students either because they fear the "feminist" label or because they believe their firms treat women badly. Suppose—and we think it reasonable—that high-gender-ratio firms have more effectively integrated women into their firms than the low-gender-ratio firms.³⁵ If true, one would expect women at the low-gender-ratio firms both to be more worried about a "feminist" label and to have more misgivings about bringing young women into the firm.³⁶ Table 11 indicates that these dynamics could be at work.

The evidence also suggests that some male interviewers may be hiring women with a quota in mind. Male interviewers from firms with low percentages of women favor women over men by

35. On the possible consequences of "tokenism" at the low-gender-ratio firms, see Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Reflections on Women and the Legal Profession: A Sociological Perspective*, 1 Harv. Women's L. J. 1 (1978).

36. Alternatively, women at the firms that treat women poorly might want to recruit more women. They might reason that increasing the number of women at their firm would give them the "critical mass" necessary to bring about changes.

over 50 percent, giving male students a .167 success rate, but female students a .261 rate; male interviewers from firms with higher concentrations of women favor women by less than 20 percent, giving male students a .205 success rate, but female students a .243 success rate. Perhaps the men from low-gender-ratio firms hope to atone for past discrimination against women at their firms, or perhaps they hope to forestall lawsuits alleging sex discrimination. For whatever the reason, they favor women more strongly than the male interviewers from the high-gender-ratio firms.

C. Student Gender and Firm Selection

As noted earlier, the general interviewing advantage among women might also result from a difference in the firms at which men and women choose to interview. For example, because they fear discrimination, women may interview with less selective firms or with firms that maintain a reputation for strongly favoring women. Although this would not explain why male and female lawyers respond differently to male and female students, it might help explain the generally higher success rates among women. Again, our data contain no direct measures of a firm's selectivity or sensitivity toward the concerns of women. Yet, they do permit us to test the size and gender-ratio of the firms with which men and women decide to interview.

Because large firms tend to be more selective than small firms (see Table 2), any tendency among women to interview with smaller firms might help explain their higher success rates. Unfortunately, the explanation does not work. Men and women interview with large firms at approximately the same overall rates. Of the interviews involving male students, 66.1 percent took place with large firms; of those involving female students, 70.2 percent involved large firms.³⁷

Likewise, if women tended to interview with firms known to be partial to women, that tendency might explain their greater interviewing success. Thus, if (1) firm gender-ratio correlated with any such partiality, and (2) women interviewed heavily with high-gender-ratio firms, those facts might account for their high success rates. This explanation works no better than the other, for the over-all difference in success rates for women at high-and-low-gender-ratio firms is small: women have a 23.6 percent success rate at the former, and a 22.7 percent rate at the latter.³⁸

37. These figures include all interviews, regardless of interviewer gender or school year of student.

38. All interviews were counted regardless of interviewer gender or school year

D. *Evidence of Discrimination—Return Rates and Summer Programs*

Women fare better than men at the on-campus interviews. Some readers will find this reassuring; others will find it troubling—but the phenomenon itself is clear. Other aspects of our data, however, show that law firms may not yet be quite as hospitable to women as this statement might suggest. Consider the eagerness of third-year women with low G.P.A.s to return to the interview pool and the differing success rates of second- and third-year students.³⁹

1. Third-Year Return Rates

We may not know directly what success third-year students had during their summer internship, but we do have indirect evidence on point: whether students interview for jobs during their third year. Students who had a successful summer job will less likely interview during their third year than those whose internship was unsatisfactory. According to Table 12, though, among students with below-median G.P.A.s, a significantly larger portion of the women interviewed as third-year students than the men.⁴⁰ During the second-year, a larger fraction of men with below-median G.P.A.s (.685) participated in the interviews than women (.526); by the third-year, a greater fraction of women (.538) participated than men (.459). This phenomenon does not occur among students as a whole. Although second-year men are more likely to interview than second-year women (a participation rate of 78.1 percent for men compared to 74.8 percent for women), the same holds true at the third-year level (a 48.7 percent male participation rate compared to a 46.7 percent female rate).

This result may suggest (once again, it certainly does not prove) that law firms discriminate against female summer interns. First, the firms may offer permanent jobs to smaller percentages of the women than the men. Even if law firms offer summer jobs to the higher achieving women, they may pick men among the lower achieving students. Second, the firms may discriminate against women in more subtle ways. And in this sense, our data

of student. Note that the effect of firm gender-ratio varies greatly depending on whether second- or third-year students are interviewing. For the effect of firm gender-ratio on interviewing success during the second year, see Table 11, *supra*; for the effect during the third year, see note 42, *infra*.

39. We are comparing two different student populations and are not conducting a longitudinal study of interviewing success over time.

40. The difference between the male and female participation rates among the below-median students is statistically significant at the 95% level (one-tailed test).

TABLE 12
Participation in Interview Pool
(Below-median-G.P.A. Students)

		Student		Dif.	Norm.
		M	F		
Second year	No. interviewees ^a	63	30		
	No. students	92	57		
	p participation	.685	.526	.159	1.94
	Var (p)	.00235	.00437	.00672	
Third year	No. interviewees	34	35		
	No. students	74	65		
	p participation	.459	.538	-.079	-0.93
	Var (p)	.00336	.00382	.00718	

^a In sample population, not total student body.

provide *more* information than any direct evidence about which firms made offers to which summer interns. Even if a law firm even-handedly extends offers, after all, it may make women sufficiently uncomfortable that they do not want to return. Any study that looked only at the distribution of offers would miss such prejudice. Our data—by testing the rate by which third-year students return to the interview pool—captures a richer phenomenon: the dissatisfaction that a large portion of the third-year female students feel about the firms at which they interned.

2. Summer Programs

The differing call-back rates for second- and third-year students also suggest a possible law-firm bias against women. Consider Table 13: male interviewers did strongly prefer second-year women to men (giving women a 25.2 percent success rate compared to 18.3 percent for men), but they treated third-year men and women almost identically. At least two reasons for this phenomenon suggest themselves, but neither augurs entirely well for women. First, male lawyers may care more about having a steady corps of young women at the firm during the summer than in integrating women into the firm's permanent staff.⁴¹ They may hire women, in other words, more to enliven the summer program than

41. Anyone inclined to dismiss this suggestion as preposterous should recall the King & Spaulding 1983 summer outing. This premier Atlanta law firm—home to Charles Kirbo and Griffin Bell—had planned to have its female summer interns compete in a wet T-shirt contest. When “cooler heads prevailed,” as the *Wall Street Journal* put it, the firm substituted swimsuits for wet T-shirts and proceeded

because they see a permanent place for women at the firm. Second, some hiring committees see the second-year summer program as a chance to test "high-risk" recruits. If many men do still question the place of female lawyers at their law firms, they may see women as "high-risk." To the extent they do so, the male preference for women will decrease from the second year to the third.⁴²

TABLE 13

Probability of Success with Male Interviewer by School year

		Student		Dif.	Norm.
		M	F		
Second year	Number	383	218		
	Called back	70	55		
	p call-back	.183	.252	-.069	-1.53
	Var (p)	.00039	.00085	.00124	
Third year	Number	143	107		
	Called back	36	28		
	p call-back	.252	.262	-.010	-0.17
	Var (p)	.00132	.00181	.00312	

V. Conclusions

Grades matter and review matters: students with high grades and law-review editors find it easier to obtain call-backs than others. That much we suspected. But we also discovered that the alleged importance of the review duplicates in part the importance of G.P.A., and that large firms value G.P.A. more than review membership while small firms care more about review. Furthermore, gender and race may also matter and may cut in directions that will surprise many readers. Although we conducted too few interviews to reach a statistically significant conclusion about ethnicity, our data tentatively suggest that on-campus interviewers may *avoid* minorities in the first three G.P.A. quartiles. By contrast, particularly during the second year, interviewers definitely *favor* women.

Readers should take care not to exaggerate the importance of these findings. As noted at the outset, we studied only one school

with the contest. James B. Stewart, *Are Women Lawyers Discriminated Against at Large Law Firms*, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1983, at 1.

42. We identified two contexts in which third-year women actually have lower success rates in interviewing than men. First, third-year women have a 16.9% success rate whereas men have a 21.7% rate with large firms. Second, third-year women have a 20.8% success rate whereas men have a 30.6% success rate at low-gender-ratio firms.

and only one interviewing season. Although we believe our results representative, we certainly have no proof. Furthermore, we primarily studied only the probability of a second-year student's obtaining a call-back from an on-campus interview. Third-year interviews differ in a variety of ways, and life after graduation differs even more. At this initial point of entry into the profession, however, the following seems clear: ethnicity may matter; grades, review membership, and gender definitely matter. Firms may avoid minority students; they definitely favor high-G.P.A. students, law-review members, and women.