Volume 43, Issue 1 (2025)

Elder Evictions: Relief Coming 2021

Image Attribution: Glen Stubbe, Star Tribune 

 

By Abigail Hanson, Lead Managing Editor

 

Effective August 2021, Minnesota will have a long overdue safeguard for our state’s seniors: heightened protections from assisted living facilities (ALF) evictions. The Elder Care and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act, passed in 2019, provides for not only procedural eviction protections for ALF residents, but a myriad of other checks and balances that benefit consumers.

One critical aspect of the 2019 Act, is the establishment of a licensure system for ALFs, a basic regulatory standard of which Minnesota is the last in the country to adopt. Currently, Minnesota’s ALFs are registered with the Minnesota Department of Health as Housing with Services (HWS) establishments. Fittingly, ALFs provide both housing and services, the latter of which can include anything from meals and housekeeping, to medication support or assistance with activities such as dressing or bathing.

The popularity of ALFs has skyrocketed in the last two decades, with the number of these facilities roughly tripling since 2000. The prevalence of ALFs is further put into perspective when compared to the number of nursing homes in the state, which total just 361. In 2020, over 50,000 Minnesotans received assisted living services and/or dementia care at HWS facilities. As the popularity of ALFs has increased, these facilities have started to house adults with more serious medical conditions. Nationally, upwards of 50% of ALF residents need help with bathing, dressing, or walking, and 42% suffer from dementia.

Yet, the structure of Minnesota’s HWS laws, the framework under which ALFs have, and currently, exist, fail to recognize the increasing complexities and vulnerabilities within these resident populations. For example, residents’ housing is still governed by basic landlord-tenant law. As such, ALF residents, who may be suffering from dementia or require heightened medical care, are subject to the same notice and eviction proceedings as anyone renting out an apartment. Moreover, ALF residents are susceptible to back-door evictions, which occur when their services are reduced or cut off, forcing them to move out and find a new service provider. This backdoor eviction method has become especially concerning during the COVID-19 pandemic. Minnesota’s eviction moratorium, instituted through executive order, does not foreclose upon the stoppage or reduction of ALF services. Thus, for residents of ALFs—a group whose age alone puts them at increased risk for serious complications from COVID-19—evictions during the pandemic are a real possibility.

 

Elder Care & Vulnerable Adult Protection Act

Codified under chapter 144G, the 2019 Act, whose main provisions become effective August 2021, provides for the licensure and regulation of ALFs. Overarching changes include training and staffing requirements for ALFs, along with the establishment of minimum standards of care for residents. Many statutory provisions increase consumer protections, including the creation of an assisted living bill of rights and required contract disclosures related to a resident’s lease and services plan, now deemed their “assisted living contract.” Building upon these statutory safeguards is section 144G.52, which provides procedural protections for resident terminations (i.e. evictions).

 

Pre-Termination Procedural Protections

Section 144G.52 expands the definition of termination. This simple change is the foundation for resident eviction protections found within the Elder Care Act. When effective in 2021, the definition will afford procedural protections to both the termination of housing and services received by residents in ALFs.

Additionally, termination of either housing or services may only occur under the following circumstances: (1) nonpayment, (2) violation of an assisted living contract (of which a resident needs to be given a chance to cure), or (3) limited situations where a resident has interfered with the health and safety of fellow residents or staff. The narrow bases on which an ALF may terminate a resident’s housing or services reduce opportunities for arbitrary discharges, such as when a facility threatens eviction based upon resident’s reported concerns or complaints.

Significantly, an ALF must schedule a pre-termination meeting with the resident. The meeting’s purpose is to lay out the reasons for the proposed housing or service termination, but also to “identify and offer reasonable accommodations or modifications, interventions, or alternatives to avoid the termination or enable the resident to remain in the facility.” Not only does this offer an opportunity for residents to avoid termination, but this process actively involves additional resident advocates. Legal and designated representatives for the resident, are required by the statute to be invited to the pre-termination meeting. The additional support can help the resident to effectively advocate with ALF administrators.

 

Post-Termination Procedural Protections

If the pre-termination meeting does not result in a path for continued housing or services, the ALF may terminate the resident after providing notice. However, the notice must include information on the resident’s appeal rights, in addition to contact information for the Office of Ombudsman for Long-Term Care and Senior LinkAge Line, vital advocates for older adults in Minnesota. Under current HWS law, residents must go through the stress of eviction proceedings and have no recourse for service terminations; thus, the Elder Care Act’s inclusion of appeal opportunities bolsters residents’ chances for stability.

If a resident chooses not to appeal, or receives an adverse determination upon appeal, the obligations of the ALF do not end. An ALF must prepare a relocation plan and participate in a coordinated move, ensuring the resident has a safe location. Excluded from chapter 144G’s definition of safe locations are “private home[s] where the occupant is unwilling or unable to care for the resident,” homeless shelters, hotels, and motels. The statute goes further, explicitly stating that a “facility may not terminate a resident’s housing or services if the resident will, as the result of the termination, become homeless.”

 

The strengthened pre- and post-termination procedures of the Elder Law Act provide needed protections for Minnesota’s seniors, favoring stability and safety. Required pre-termination meetings with advocates and ALF administrators can prevent the emotional upheaval that forced transitions can cause, specifically for those experiencing dementia. Post-termination coordinated moves may help to curb the sobering increase in homelessness among Minnesota’s older adults. Consumer protections and regulations of ALFs are long overdue in Minnesota, and the changes effective 2021 will be a welcome relief to older adults across the state.

 

 

 

The Myth of the Firm Exception: Why Trial Lawyers Continues to Harm Contract Workers

By: Zinaida Carroll, Volume 43 Executive Editor

View/Download PDF Version: The Myth of the Firm Exception – Why Trial Lawyers Continues to Harm Contract Workers (Carroll)

Introduction

In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, the Supreme Court decided that a coordinated strike and demand for better wages was per se illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act.[1] While this case was decided in 1990, its holding continues to prevent workers who fall outside the traditional employer-employee relationship from organizing for better working conditions. The Trial Lawyers reasoning is flawed because it places workers striking for increased wages into the same field as a profit-maximizing business. The “firm exemption”[2] to price-fixing is insufficient, because it leaves workers who are not formally organized or outside of the traditional employee-employer relationship unable to collectively strike in demand of better wages. Rather than the Court’s inauthentic attempt to place court-appointed lawyers into the same category as businesses attempting to fix prices on the free market, courts should look to the purpose beyond coordinated efforts to raise wages––here, improving wages and work conditions––in determining whether a coordinated action can be considered price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The purpose behind the coordination in Trial Lawyers cannot be said to fit into the evils antitrust laws were designed to protect, and thus, the labor exemption should cover these types of actions. This should be the case whether or not the group of individuals engaging in this action can be deemed a “firm.”

I. Background

In Trial Lawyers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged that the plaintiffs “entered into an agreement among themselves and with other lawyers to restrain trade” in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).[3] The defendants were a group of about 100 lawyers who agreed amongst themselves to not accept Criminal Justice Act (CJA) appointments until their wages were increased. The Court found that the defendants’ agreement “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”[4] The Court deemed the defendants’ collective action of refusing to accept appointments until their wages were increased to be unlawful, inter-firm “price-fixing” under Section 1 of the FTCA.[5]

II. Analysis

The Court construed the lawyers’ organizing to refuse appointments until their wages increased as either “agreeing upon a price, which [would] decrease the quantity demanded,” or “agreeing upon an output, which [would] increase the price offered.”[6] The Court declined to consider how the lawyers’ organizing might not fit into this market-based model, stating, “it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements.”[7]

Under the Sherman Act, it is, generally, the Court’s duty to “pass upon the social utility” of a violation.[8] Section 5(a) of the FTCA bans “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .”[9] A practice is “unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.[10] In other words, the Act tells courts to weigh the potential harms against the potential benefits to consumers. However, by declaring the lawyer’s scheme as per se illegal price-fixing, the Court avoided having to consider arguments about any countervailing benefits of the scheme. If the Court had not labeled this as per se illegal price-fixing, they could not have found a violation of Section 5. Here, the potential harms are nonexistent. There is no competition in this “market.” CJA lawyers’ salaries are set by the government, and each lawyer receives the same fees. The “consumers” of this market, individuals who are being charged with a crime and unable to afford counsel, face no negative consequences from increased salaries. Contrastingly, on the other side of the scale, the “consumers” face a potential benefit from increased wages: with increased wages, lawyers would provide more effective counsel.

The Court also declined to find the First Amendment protected the lawyers’ actions. While the activities of publicizing the boycott, explaining the merits of the case, and lobbying district officials were protected, the coordinated price fixing was not. The Court distinguished the lawyers’ case from Claiborne, finding the “undenied objective of their boycott was an economic advantage for those who agreed to participate,” while in Claiborne, the individuals boycotting “sought no special advantage themselves.”[11] The Court further characterizes the lawyers as “business competitors” who “stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market.”[12] The Court dispensed of the Court of Appeals’ finding that prohibitions against price-fixing and boycotts “do not serve any substantial governmental interest unless the price-fixing competitors actually possess market power.”[13] The Court said it was unwilling to make an exception for cases such as these, even if their boycott were “uniquely expressive,” because the government has a strong “interest in adhering to a uniform rule” even in a case where allowing an exception “might cause no serious damage.”[14]

The Court sets forth the rule from O’Brien for protecting activity under the First Amendment:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment Freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.[15]

The Court said that the Court of Appeals’ analysis “exaggerate[d] the significance of the expressive component” in the lawyers’ coordinated action and “denigrate[d] the importance of the rule of law that respondents violated.”[16]

The Court, instead, should have weighed the government interest in enforcing the violation in the case at hand against the interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of these workers rather than focusing on the general interest in preventing price-fixing in the free market. While, as the Court insists, the government has a strong interest in protecting against price-fixing schemes in the capitalist market, this is not what is happening in this case. The lawyers are not “business competitors” that the government has an interest in protecting under antitrust law, but contractors for a public service. Weighing the government’s minimal interest in enforcing antitrust laws against workers’ demanding better wages with the lawyers’ First Amendment right to refuse to work in demand of better pay, the Court should have found that the government did not satisfy the O’Brien test.

The Court’s insistence in fitting the lawyers’ coordinated efforts into the same category of cases as price-fixing schemes is disingenuous. Contrary to the Court’s insistence that the lawyers were acting as anti-competitive business entities attempting to push out competition, the stated purpose of raising prices was not to create an economic advantage for those who chose to participate. There is no competition in this field: lawyers are not offering up their services at the lowest price to be picked by a judge to appoint an indigent client. None of these lawyers are seeking a separate advantage for themselves compared to other lawyers. They were pressuring the government to raise the wage for all CJA appointed lawyers. This kind of activity is not of the kind the Sherman Act was designed to protect, as evidenced by the several amendments following its enactment after it was repeatedly enforced against workers.[17] The Court insists that an exception to this rule would not outweigh the benefits of a uniform rule. However, this case should not be considered an exception, but rather, an action that entirely falls outside of the bounds the Sherman Act.

The question of whether the labor exemption granted by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts extend to situations where the labor relationship falls outside the bounds of a traditional employer-employee relationship, such as contractors or subtractors, is contested. In the final days of the Biden administration, the FTC released a policy statement stating that, in their view,

[T]he labor exemption’s application does not turn on whether a worker is formally classified by a firm as an independent contractor . . . . Rather, workers’ organizing and collective bargaining activity may be protected from antitrust liability when what is at issue is the compensation for their labor or their working conditions.[18]

Courts have found that the labor exemption extends beyond this traditional relationship in several cases.[19] Consistent with Trial Lawyers, “[c]ourts have . . . rejected application of the exemption where the party seeking the exemption was best characterized as an independent business pursuing its business interests, rather than as a worker who provides labor services seeking to improve his or her compensation or labor conditions.”[20] Here, the workers cannot be considered independent businesses pursuing their own interests. They are workers who are acting together to improve their wages.

Antitrust law allows economic coordination in situations such as collective bargaining and price setting “within business firms” but bars them “when they take place beyond firm boundaries.”[21] In other words, contract-based employees, such as the defendants in Trial Lawyers, are unable to organize and collectively bargain for wages. However, if they are incorporated as a firm, then they would not subject to antitrust liability for the same actions as in Trial Lawyers. Deciding whether workers are violating antitrust laws based upon whether they are incorporated as a firm or not is arbitrary, protecting some workers’ rights to demand better working conditions while leaving other workers demanding the same rights without protection. Rather than trying to squeeze workers like those in Trial Lawyers into a false narrative of individuals acting as firms and price-fixing between themselves, courts should look to the facts in front of them and see whether they are seeking to improve their compensation or labor conditions. If workers are striking to demand better wages for that purpose, then they should be exempted from antitrust liability.

One present group of workers facing the perils of this arbitrary distinction are ride-share drivers. Ride-share companies have been permitted to set consumer prices across drivers who use their application.[22] However, ride-share drivers are barred, under antitrust law, from coordinating amongst themselves to demand better wages from their company.[23] Rather than fabricate a reality where ride-share drivers are on the same field as the ride-share companies that contract them and seeking to price-fix for some sort of profit maximizing gain, courts should look to the true purpose behind the coordination efforts amongst ride-share drivers to determine whether they should be exempted from antitrust liability. A company’s capitalistic purpose cannot be equated to an individual’s demand for better wages.

Conclusion

The per se liability for price-fixing set out by the Court in Trial Lawyers refuses to acknowledge the realities of how workers who fall outside the traditional employer-employee relationship exist in the world. The Court places contract workers in the same category as profit-maximizing businesses. However, the purpose behind what the Court deems “price-fixing” in the context of workers striking for better wages, in reality, is not the same as coordinated price fixing between companies across some sort of sector participating in the capitalist market. Rather than applying a per se rule, courts should look to the purpose of coordinated wage setting by workers to determine whether there is an antitrust violation.

[1] FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 110 S.Ct. 768, 772–73 (1990).

[2] Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 72 L. & Contemporary Problems 65, 66 (2019).

[3] Trial Lawyers, 110 S.Ct. at 772–73.

[4] Id. at 774.

[5] Id.

[6] Id. at 775.

[7] Id. at 774.

[8] Id. at 774.

[9] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

[10] Id. § 45(n) (emphasis added).

[11] Trial Lawyers, 110 S.Ct. at 777 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 778.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Policy Statement on Exemption of Protected Labor Activity by Workers from Antitrust Liability 2–3 (Jan. 14, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/enforcement-policy-statement-exemption-protected-labor-activity-workers-antitrust-liability (explaining that Section 20 of the Clayton Act passed in 1914 created a labor exemption to antitrust laws and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 further clarified the labor exemptions, including preventing courts from issuing injunctions in cases growing out of a labor dispute).

[18] Id. at 1.

[19] Id. at 8 (citing several First Circuit cases).

[20] Id. at 9 (citing several cases, including from the First and Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court).

[21] Sanjukta Paul & Nathan Tankus, The Firm Exemption and the Hierarchy of Finance in the Gig Economy, 16 U. St. Thomas L.J. 44, 45 (2019).

[22] Id. at 46–47.

[23] Id. at 47.

Minimum Wage and the Tipping Culture Divide

Annali Cler*

On November 3rd, voters flocked to the polls, and election results gripped the nation for the following week. Although the presidential race captured headlines, another important vote occurred that day. In Florida, voters approved an amendment to the state’s minimum wage. Florida’s minimum wage for non-tipped employees will increase to $15 by 2026, while non-tipped employees will earn $11.98. Not only will this amendment make Florida one of the few states with a $15 minimum wage, but it also boosts Florida’s tipped employees well above the federal minimum cash wage and that of many states. Tipped employees have a unique pay structure, where employers only have to pay $2.13 per hour directly to the employee if that number combined with tips received adds up to the federal minimum hourly wage (or the state required wage). The obvious difference in pay raises questions about the existence of tipping culture and the need for a separate category of employees. 

The little-known history of tipping in the U.S gets its roots from racist practices following the Civil War. In the 1850s, wealthy Americans brought the practice back from Europe. Initially, many Americans opposed tipping, seeing it as an extra expense on top of the cost of food. Attitudes began to shift in the 1860s. After the Civil War, people who were freed from slavery had limited employment options and often turned to sharecropping or service positions, such as servants or porters. Tipping functioned as a way for employers to avoid paying their workers and as a sign of servitude. In 1902, a journalist wrote “[Black workers] take tips, of course; one expects that of them–it is a token of their inferiority.” Low or no wage work therefore continued to exist long after the abolition of slavery.

The development of labor law continued to make distinctions among workers. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 exempted certain occupations from minimum wages. Employers in the agricultural and domestic sectors, jobs largely held by people of color, were not required to pay the federal minimum wage. These exemptions still exist. 

Saru Jayaraman, co-founder and president of Restaurant Opportunities Centers United (ROC United), says “[i]t’s the legacy of slavery that turned the tip in the United States from a bonus or extra on top of a wage . . . to a wage itself.” Tipping as a wage structure perpetuates low valuations on certain kinds of work, particularly service jobs. 

Further, tipped work worsens inequality in several dimensions. Research suggests that white workers receive bigger tips than black workers. Additionally, two-thirds of tipped workers in states that do not mandate full state minimum wage, which encompasses 43 states, are women. Although some argue tipping is a means to incentivize employees to work harder, the high rate of poverty for workers in restaurant industry compared to the general population suggests that tips alone do not provide a living wage, regardless of one’s work ethic.

Florida’s amendment signals acknowledgement by the public that the current federal minimum wages for non-tipped and tipped employees have failed to keep up with the cost of living. An increase in minimum wages across the board would benefit service workers, especially women and people of color, who are over-represented in that sector. Recognizing the inequitable rationales behind the distinction between non-tipped and tipped employees, Florida is moving in the right direction by bringing tipped employees above the federal minimum wage for employees generally.

*J.D. Candidate (2021), University of Minnesota Law School

The Burying of Boumediene v. Bush

Kevin Thomson*

At the University of Minnesota Law School in 2018, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that the court “erred greatly” when it gave into political pressure and upheld the internment of Japanese Americans in the “shameful” decision Korematsu v. United States. The Court is at its best, said the Chief Justice, when it stands athwart political pressure. 

One case unmentioned but nevertheless a viable candidate for the Court at its best is Boumediene v. Bush. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  In the fog of the War on Terror, the Court held the Suspension Clause applied to Guantanamo Bay and the weak procedures provided by Congress were an inadequate substitute to habeas corpus. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, writing in the pages of the New York Review of Books, declared it “a great victory.” And it was. But now, the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have buried the effects of Boumediene, sending a once great victory into the graveyard of constitutional law. This short blog post will outline the key holdings of Boumediene, where they have been undermined and where they survive. 

In 2006, Congress had passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) which provided minimal procedures to Guantanamo detainees in the form Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT), and the Military Commission Act (MCA) which stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction. Limited judicial review was granted to the D.C. Circuit, which could review whether the CSRTs complied with procedures promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. The plaintiffs in Boumediene challenged these laws under the Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which reads: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

The Boumediene Court addressed the case in two steps. Step 1 asked the threshold question of whether the Suspension Clause extended to Guantanamo Bay. Step 2 asked whether the CSRTs and limited D.C. Circuit review constituted an “adequate substitute” to habeas corpus. The Court answered “Yes” on Step 1 and “No” on Step 2. In doing so, Boumediene left two legacies: a functional approach to extraterritoriality and a robust interpretation of the Suspension Clause. 

The Court, in extending the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo Bay, rejected a formalist interpretation of the Clause’s reach. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, applied a functional test, asking, in part, whether the extension of the Suspension Clause would be impracticable and anomalous.” Prior cases had sharply limited the application of the Constitution to the de jure territoriality sovereignty of the United States or to plaintiffs with significant voluntary connections to it. It was under the guidance of these cases that the Bush Administration chose Guantanamo Bay, where the government could be unburdened by constitutional concerns. After all, Guantanamo detainees had no voluntary connections to the United States, and Guantanamo Bay, located in Cuba, was outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States. 

The Boumediene court rejected this manipulation and held the U.S. exercised de facto control over Guantanamo Bay and applying the Suspension Clause to it would not present any practical concerns. The hope was that the “impracticable and anomalous” test would spread beyond the Suspension Clause, and the government could not shed its constitutional duties by traveling abroad. 

This hope was quickly dampened. There are a number of cases to note, but two are warrant special consideration. In Alliance for Open Society, a case seeking to extend the First Amendment abroad, the Court declared: “[I]t is long settled as a matter of American constitutional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under the U.S. Constitution.” 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020). This proposition, while not formally overruling Boumediene, revived a formalist, line-drawing approach to extraterritoriality. 

It was in the spirit of Alliance, and not Boumediene, that this past August the D.C. Circuit shut the door on the application of procedural or substantive due process rights for Guantanamo detainees in Al Hela v. Trump. 972 F.3d 120 (2020).  There, the D.C. Circuit, citing Alliance, went out of their way to hold that the Fifth Amendment does not apply at Guantanamo Bay. Without the co-extension of the Due Process Clause, the lasting effect of Boumediene’s strong interpretation of the Suspension Clause is considerably weakened. 

The functional “impracticable and anomalous” test still applies when analyzing the reach of the Suspension Clause. And areas where the U.S. exercises de facto sovereignty – like Guantanamo Bay – are “U.S. territory,” meaning the Alliance rule does not apply. But these are small echoes for such a great case. 

The second key holding of Boumediene was its robust interpretation of the Suspension Clause. Decided in 2020, Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam is the first case interpreting the Suspension Clause after Boumediene. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). In Thuraissigiam, the Court held that expediated removal procedures limiting judicial review for migrants did not violate the Suspension Clause because the plaintiff – a man seeking asylum – did not seek release but additional procedure. 

There is much to be said about how Thuraissigiam affected Boumediene from its originalism to the misinterpretation of the writ in immigration cases. But one important implication of the case is its conception of the purpose of habeas corpus. 

The interpretation of the history of habeas corpus and the current case law is split between two conceptions of habeas: a rights-centric view and a power-skeptical view. The power-skeptical view focuses an analysis of the Suspension Clause on the jailer – not the jailed. It questions the power of judiciary to review the “legality of the exercise of executive power,” as Justice Sotomayor put it in her dissent. Under this interpretation, the expediated removal procedures are unconstitutional for barring judicial inquiry into the legality of expeditated deportation orders. 

On the other hand, a rights-centric view focuses on the jailed, not the jailer. It looks to the plaintiff’s (lack of) constitutional rights, not the legality of the Executive’s actions. But standing alone, those subject to Executive detention, whether the alleged enemy combatants in Boumediene or recently arrived migrants in Thuraissigiam, are likely to have little claim to constitutional right. A rights-centric Suspension Clause is a weak Suspension Clause.

Boumediene embraced the power-skeptical view. The majority proclaimed: “The Clause is designed to protect against cyclical abuses of the writ by the Executive and Legislative Branches.” But the Court in Thuraissigiam undermined this power-skeptical view by concentrating solely on the plaintiff’s lack of right instead of the illegality of the Executive’s action. 

Some hope remains for Boumediene. The Boumediene court held “at an absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’” The Court in Thuraissigiam, seizing on an apparent concession in a footnote in the plaintiff’s brief, analyzed the writ only as it existed in 1789. Future plaintiffs may be able to make claims based on post-1789 developments in the Suspension Clause jurisprudence. How the current court will handle those arguments – and whether Boumediene can be resurrected – remains to be seen. 

 

*J.D. Candidate, 2021.